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Reproductive skew theory seeks to integrate social and ecological factors thought to influence the division of reproduction
among group-living animals. However, most reproductive skew models only examine interactions between individuals of the same
sex. Here, we suggest that females can influence group stability and conflict among males by modifying their clutch size and may
do so if they benefit from the presence of subordinate male helpers or from reduced conflict. We develop 3 models, based on
concessions-based, restraint, and tug-of-war models, in which female clutch size is variable and ask when females will increase
their clutch size above that which would be optimal in the absence of male–male conflict. In concessions-based and restraint
models, females should increase clutch size above their optima if the benefits of staying for subordinate males are relatively low.
Relatedness between males has no effect on clutch size. When females do increase clutch size, the division of reproduction
between males is not influenced by relatedness and does not differ between restraint and concessions-based models. Both of
these predictions are in sharp contrast to previous models. In tug-of-war models, clutch size is strongly influenced by relatedness
between males, with the largest clutches, but the fewest surviving offspring, produced when males are unrelated. These 3 models
demonstrate the importance of considering third-party interests in the decisions of group-living organisms. Key words: brood size,
conflict reduction, dominance hierarchy, male quality, mate choice. [Behav Ecol 18:467–476 (2007)]
Societies of group-breeding animals range from despotic,in which one or a few dominant individuals monopolize
all direct reproduction, to egalitarian (Vehrencamp 1983a,
1983b). Reproductive skew theory attempts to explain this
variation in the division of reproduction within dominance-
structured breeding groups in relation to ecological and social
variables. In the more than 2 decades since the first optimal
skew models were developed (Vehrencamp 1983a, 1983b),
numerous variants have been proposed, examining the roles
of such factors as relatedness, ecological constraints (e.g.,
Vehrencamp 1983a, 1983b; Keller and Reeve 1994; Reeve
and Keller 1997), dominant control (e.g., Reeve et al. 1998),
group augmentation (Kokko et al. 2001), resource inheri-
tance (Kokko and Johnstone 1999; Ragsdale 1999; Cant
and Field 2001), or the cost of young on skew (Cant and
Johnstone 1999), as well as the relationship between skew and
aggression (Cant and Johnstone 2000; Reeve 2000), group size
(Hamilton 2000), or reproductive inhibition (Hamilton
2004). Two major groups of skew models have been devel-
oped: transactional models (Clutton-Brock 1998; Johnstone
2000; Reeve 2000), which assume that the reproductive shares
of dominant and subordinate group members are the out-
come of transactions over reproductive division and group
membership, and tug-of-war models (or incomplete control
models, Clutton-Brock 1998; Reeve et al. 1998; Johnstone
2000), in which reproductive division is the outcome of invest-
ment in costly competition by group members. Transactional
models can further be subdivided into concessions-based
models (Reeve and Ratnieks 1993), in which dominant indi-
viduals that can control reproductive division allocate some
direct reproduction to subordinates to entice them to stay in
the group, and restraint models (Johnstone and Cant 1999),
in which subordinates may refrain from reproducing to avoid
eviction. These 3 general models describe different social sys-
tems, which differ in which individual (if any) controls the
division of reproduction and/or group membership (for re-
view, see Johnstone 2000).
Nearly all of the extant skew models only consider interac-
tions between pairs of individuals. Even those that consider
larger groups implicitly assume interactions only within one
sex. That is, they assume that the division of reproduction
among males is not influenced by female choice and vice versa
for females. However, females often have substantial control
over the distribution of paternity (e.g., spotted hyaenas, Crocuta
crocuta, East et al. 2003). If subordinate males are helpful
in the broadest sense, that is, their presence increases the
survival of group-produced offspring, females benefit and,
in the logic of transactional models, may be willing to allow
subordinate males some direct reproduction. Recently, Cant
and Reeve (2002) developed a model incorporating female
decisions into a model of reproductive skew among males.
Among their predictions was that there would be a zone of
conflict over which females would prefer to allocate reproduc-
tion to subordinate males whereas dominant males would not.
In some cases, however, females may have little direct con-
trol over the division of reproduction or group membership.
For example, females may have difficulty avoiding sneakers
(Luttbeg 2004). Similarly, if access to the breeding female is
strongly influenced by male–male interactions, females may
only be able to control paternity by refusing matings. This may
be costly in some systems (Clutton-Brock and Parker 1995).
Even if a female can allocate reproduction to each mate, she
may be unable to prevent dominant males from circumvent-
ing that decision by evicting subordinates. Therefore, she
may gain from allocating additional reproduction to domi-
nant males to keep them from evicting or departing. Recently,
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females of the cooperatively breeding cichlid, Neolamprologus
pulcher, were found to increase clutch sizes when male helpers
had opportunities to leave the breeding group and breed
independently (Heg et al. 2006).
Why females would be able to influence group stability by
adjusting clutch size can be seen from 2-player skew models.
Group productivity has a strong influence on the division of
reproduction within groups and, especially, on the stability of
groups. Both concessions and restraint models of skew predict
that the dominant male should allow subordinates to stay (by
allocating sufficient direct reproduction or by not evicting,
respectively) when group productivity is high. Although group
productivity is generally thought of as the contribution of
subordinates or the benefits of grouping, from the male per-
spective it does not matter what mechanism leads to larger
clutches in groups (except indirectly, through changes in fu-
ture survival or fecundity of mates). If a female increases her
clutch size when breeding with a dominant and subordinate
male present, this may have similar effects on dominant and
subordinate male decisions as increasing group productivity.
Females may also adjust their clutch size regardless of
whether there is a risk of subordinate departure if they can
expect help raising offspring or gain other benefits from
grouping. Although cooperatively breeding species generally
have smaller clutches than solitary breeding taxa (Arnold and
Owens 1998; Hatchwell and Komdeur 2000), there is some
evidence that, within populations, females with helpers or
those who expect greater care produce more or larger young
(Craig 1980; Taborsky 1984; Hunter 1985; Kolm 2001). Here,
we seek to examine the conditions under which females
would increase their clutch size above their own optimum to
retain the subordinate or to reduce costly conflict between
males. We model concessions-based, restraint, and tug-of-war
versions of this scenario.
THE MODEL
In these models, we assume that the decisions of females and
dominant and subordinate males are simultaneous, single
‘‘sealed-bids.’’ Simultaneous decisions are assumed in most
skew models, and by assuming this, we can compare the influ-
ence of third-party decisions with the predictions of classical
models. We acknowledge that decisions regarding reproduc-
tive division, reproductive output, and group membership of-
ten will be sequential. Systems likely to meet the assumptions
of these models are presented in the Discussion of this paper.
Parameters used in the models are listed in Table 1.
Clutch size is often assumed to reflect 2 trade-offs: between
current and future reproduction and between number and
survival of the current brood (Stearns 1992). As such, a gen-
eral model for direct fitness as a function of clutch size (n) is
wf ðnÞ ¼ sðnÞ
X
i
piqin1 ff ðnÞ; ð1Þ
wiðnÞ ¼ piqinsðnÞ1 fiðnÞ: ð2Þ
In Equation 1, s(n) is the survival of offspring and f(n) is
future reproductive success, both of which may decline with
increasing clutch size. The quality of each male is denoted
by qi, whereas the proportion of offspring of each male is de-
noted pi. To simplify, we consider 2 possible breeding scenar-
ios: pair breeding (i.e., a single male and female) or group
breeding with one female and 2 males that differ in social
status (i 2{D,S} where D is the dominant male and S the sub-
ordinate). We refer to the proportion of offspring of the sub-
ordinate as p and that of the dominant as 1p. Under the
simplifying assumptions that male future reproductive success
is not influenced by brood size and is the same for group and
pair breeding males, the future fitness cost of fathering a large
clutch can be ignored for males. We use the following func-
tions to relate clutch size to female and male current and
future reproductive success:
ff ðnÞ ¼ 1 anm; ð3aÞ
fiðnÞ ¼ 0: ð3bÞ
For simplicity, we assume that m ¼ 2. We used the following
survival functions for pair-produced offspring, sa(n), and
group-produced offspring sg(n):
saðnÞ ¼ 1 bn; ð3cÞ
sg ðnÞ ¼ ð1 bnÞð11 hÞ; ð3dÞ
where the value of subordinate help, h, bn. We assume that h
is fixed and depends only on the presence of the subordinate.
For dominant males (i ¼ D), we set qD ¼ 1. The current
direct fitness of a dominant male breeding in a pair is
wDa ðnÞ ¼ nasaðnÞ: ð4aÞ
If it breeds in a group with a subordinate male, its current
direct fitness is
wDg ðnÞ ¼ ð1 pÞng sg ðnÞ: ð4bÞ
We set the ratio of subordinate to dominant male genetic
quality as y ¼ qD/qS. Subordinate males that leave the group
Table 1
Parameters used in the models
Symbol
All models
a Cost of producing a clutch of one on future female survival
b Cost of clutch size on survival of current brood
i Male status (dominant, D or subordinate, S)
m Scaling constant relating clutch size to future female
survival (assumed to be 2)
na Clutch size when breeding as a pair
ng Clutch size when breeding in group
qi Quality of male i
p Proportion of direct reproduction obtained by subordinate
r Relatedness between dominant and subordinate males
sa Expected survival of current brood if breeding as a pair
sg Expected survival of current brood if breeding in group
y Quality of subordinate male relative to dominant male
Transactional models only
h Effect of help on survival of current brood
x Probability that subordinate male finds a breeding
position if it leaves
Restraint model only
e Direct cost of eviction for dominant
Tug-of-war model only
b Subordinate efficiency in converting investment in
struggle for reproduction into competitive success
in tug-of-war model
d Dominant investment in struggle for reproduction
in tug-of-war model
u Subordinate investment in struggle for reproduction
in tug-of-war model
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may face ‘‘ecological constraints’’ such as predation risk or
habitat saturation that prevent them from establishing a breed-
ing territory. Thus, their expected reproductive success is dis-
counted by a factor, x (hereafter referred to as ‘‘opportunities
for independent breeding’’), so that the expected current di-
rect reproductive successes of a subordinate male attempting
to breed in a pair and in a group are
wSa ðnÞ ¼ xynasaðnÞ; ð5aÞ
wSg ðnÞ ¼ pyng sg ðnÞ: ð5bÞ
TRANSACTIONAL MODELS
Concessions-based model
In a concessions-based model, dominant males are assumed
to have complete control over reproductive division. However,
subordinates can decide whether to remain in the group or
to attempt pair breeding. As in the classical concessions-
based model, the minimum proportion of reproduction, p,
that will entice subordinates to remain in the group is that
which equalizes the payoffs to pair and group breeding, that is
when
wSa ðnÞ1 rwDa ðnÞ ¼ wSg ðn; pÞ1 rwDg ðn; pÞ: ð6Þ
This is so when
p* ¼ ðr 1 xyÞnasaðnaÞ  rng sg ðng Þ
ng ðy  rÞsg ðng Þ : ð7Þ
When group members are relatives, subordinates may be
willing to stay in the group even if they receive no direct re-
production (note that we ignore the possibility of territory
inheritance in these models). Staying and receiving no direct
reproduction (i.e., p ¼ 0) would still yield an equal or greater
fitness payoff than leaving when
ng  rð11 hÞ 
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
rð11 hÞðrð11 hÞ  4bnaðr 1 xyÞsaðnaÞÞ
p
2rbð11 hÞ : ð8Þ
If dominants are willing to concede p*, the group will be
stable. The fitness payoff of retaining the subordinate and
yielding p* will be the same as that of allowing the subordinate
to leave when ng ¼ nmin, where
nmin ¼ 11 h 
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃð11 hÞð11 h  4bnað11 xÞsaðnaÞÞ
p
2bð11 hÞ : ð9Þ
Given p ¼ p*, dominant fitness increases with increasing
clutch size (i.e., @wD=@n.0) at nmin when y . r. Thus, when
this is so, nmin represents the minimum clutch size necessary
for group stability. It is likely that the condition y . r will be
met in most systems, as variation in genetic quality among
males is generally considered to be rather low (see also Cant
and Reeve 2002) and should decrease as relatedness between
males increases. As in classical skew models, dominant males
that permit subordinates to stay should concede exactly p*.
Female perspective
The optimal clutch size for a female breeding with a single
male (n*a ) reflects the within-clutch and future costs of repro-
duction. Female fitness when breeding with a single male,
wa(na), is found by substituting n ¼ na into Equations 1 and
3c. This is maximized with respect to clutch size (i.e.,
@waðnaÞ=@na ¼ 0 and @2waðnaÞ=@na,0) when
n*a ¼
1
2ða1 bÞ : ð10Þ
If a female can expect help raising offspring or other group
benefits that increase offspring survival, her fitness, (wg(ng)),
is found by substituting n ¼ ng into Equations 1 and 3d. Her
optimal clutch (i.e., @wg ðng Þ=@ng ¼ 0 and @2wg ðng Þ=@ng,0) is
n*g ¼
ð11 hÞðpy1 ð1 pÞÞ
2ðbð11 hÞðpy1 ð1 pÞÞ1 aÞ : ð11aÞ
If y ¼ 1, this becomes
n*g ¼
ð11 hÞ
2ðbð11 hÞ1 aÞ : ð11bÞ
The maximum clutch size that a female would be willing to
produce in a group (nmax) is the largest clutch for which
group breeding is more profitable than pair breeding (i.e.,
when wg(ng) ¼ wa(n*a )). In the simplest case, when y ¼ 1
(males are of the same genetic quality), this is when ng ¼ nmax,
where
nmax ¼ ða1 bÞð11 hÞ1
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
hða1 bÞða1 ða1 bÞð11 hÞÞp
2ða1 bÞðbð11 hÞ1 aÞ : ð12Þ
Predicted clutch and group sizes
The above thresholds yield 3 possible combinations of clutch
and group sizes. First, females may be able to produce their
optimal clutch size (n*g ), and this will be sufficient for sub-
ordinate group members to stay in the group (i.e., dominants
will allocate p* to subordinates). This will be the case if
nmin  n*g . If the female’s optimal clutch size is smaller than
nmin, she would still do better producing a larger clutch and
retaining the subordinate than she would if the subordinate
left when nmin , nmax. If this is so, a female should produce
a clutch of exactly nmin (as a larger clutch would be costly) and
subordinates should stay in the group. Finally, a female may
do better with just the dominant male than she would by
producing nmin and retaining the subordinate (i.e., nmin .
nmax). In this case, the female should produce n
*
a and the sub-
ordinate should leave the group.
The effects of several ecological and social parameters on
these thresholds are shown on Figures 1–3. Clutch size is pre-
dicted to be at the female optimum when opportunities for
dispersal, x, are low and the value of help, h, is high, that is,
when the net benefits of group breeding (for subordinate
males) are high (Figure 1a,b, respectively). As these benefits
decline (i.e., x increases or h decreases), clutch size switches
to nmin. In this phase, clutch size increases with decreasing
net benefits to group breeding. Finally, grouping is not stable
when the net benefits to grouping are low. Relatedness
between dominant and subordinate males has no effect on
clutch size.
Intuitively, high costs of producing a large clutch lead to
smaller clutches (e.g., Figure 2). However, these costs also
influence group stability. Interestingly, the cost to female fu-
ture reproductive success influences subordinate male depar-
ture from the group even though he does not pay this cost
directly (Figure 2a). When this cost is low, subordinate males
can expect relatively high success if they leave and attempt to
breed independently and dominant males can expect high
success if they evict. This is because this cost is assumed to
be the same for all females in the population, so that a male
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that leaves the group and does breed independently can
expect to attract a female that will produce a large clutch.
Not surprisingly, groups are less likely to be stable if the
within-clutch competition cost is high (Figure 2b). When this
is so, none of the group members have an interest in a large
group-produced clutch.
The relative quality of subordinate males also influences the
predicted clutch size. In particular, the maximum clutch size
that the females will be willing to produce increases strongly
with increasing relative quality of subordinates (Figure 3a).
This means that groups are more likely to persist when sub-
ordinates are of relatively high quality. The optimal clutch size
of females also increases, albeit only slightly, with increasing
subordinate quality. On Figure 3a, extrapolating the line re-
lating optimal clutch size to subordinate quality, it eventually
Figure 1
Predicted clutch size in both the concessions-based and restraint
transactional skew models depending on (a) the subordinate male’s
expected probability of finding a breeding territory on leaving the
group (x) and (b) the contribution of the subordinate male to
juvenile survival (h). The dashed line ( ) is the maximum
clutch size that the female is willing to produce to retain the sub-
ordinate male in the group. The dotted line ( ) is the
minimum clutch size for the dominant and subordinate to both
accept group breeding. The dotted/dashed line ( ) is the
female’s optimal clutch size when breeding as part of a trio. The
thick, solid black line represents the solution to the model. Note
that the predictions for the 2 transactional models are identical only
when male qualities are equal (y ¼ 1) and eviction is not costly
(e ¼ 0). Other model parameters: h ¼ 0.05, x ¼ 0.4, m ¼ 2, r ¼ 0.25,
a ¼ 0.0075, b ¼ 0.001.
Figure 2
The effects of varying costs of clutch size on model thresholds for
both transactional models. (a) Effect of varying the cost to female
future reproductive success (a). (b) Effect of varying the cost on
current juvenile survival (b). The dashed line ( ) is the
maximum clutch size that the female is willing to produce to retain
the subordinate male in the group. The dotted line ( ) is
the minimum clutch size for the dominant and subordinate to both
accept group breeding. The dotted/dashed line ( ) is the
female’s optimal clutch size when breeding as part of a trio. Other
model parameters: x ¼ 0.4, h ¼ 0.15, m ¼ 2, r ¼ 0.25, a ¼ 0.075,
b ¼ 0.001, y ¼ 1, e ¼ 0.
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intersects the subordinate’s minimum demand, which is not
influenced by its relative quality. In other words, when sub-
ordinate males are of high relative quality, the optimal clutch
for females may be more likely to exceed that required to
keep the group together.
Substituting n*g or nmin for n as appropriate into Equation 7,
the stable share of direct reproduction allocated to the sub-
ordinate is shown on Figure 4. The predicted value of p* de-
pends on whether clutch size is n*g or nmin. When clutch size is
at the female optimum n*g , the general predictions of the clas-
sical skew model (Keller and Reeve 1994) hold: p* increases
with increasing opportunities for independent breeding and
decreases with increasing relatedness. However, when clutch
size is adjusted to retain subordinates in the group (i.e., nmin.
n*g ), relatedness has no effect on skew, and predicted skew is
equal to that in the classical model when relatedness is 0.
Restraint model
In the restraint model, subordinates decide on the amount of
reproduction they will attempt to take from dominants. Dom-
inants decide whether to evict the subordinate. Eviction may
be costly to both dominant and subordinate. We include a cost
to dominants (e) (the cost to subordinates can be considered
as a part of x). The maximum proportion of reproduction that
Figure 3
The effect of varying the relative quality of the subordinate male (y)
on model thresholds for (a) the concessions-based model and (b)
the restraint model. The dashed line ( ) is the maximum
clutch size that the female is willing to produce to retain the sub-
ordinate male in the group. The dotted line ( ) is the
minimum clutch size for the dominant and subordinate to both
accept group breeding. The dotted/dashed line ( ) is the
female’s optimal clutch size when breeding as part of a trio. Other
model parameters: x ¼ 0.4, h ¼ 0.15, m ¼ 2, r ¼ 0.25, a ¼ 0.075,
b ¼ 0.001, e ¼ 0.
Figure 4
Effects of relatedness between males (r) and opportunities for
dispersal (y) on predicted skew (expressed as the proportion of
reproduction allocated to the subordinate male) for the (a)
concessions-based and (b) restraint models. Clutch sizes for the
same parameters are shown in Figure 1.
Hamilton and Heg • Clutch-size adjustments and skew models 471
subordinates can take from dominants is that which equalizes
the payoff to dominants for group and pair breeding. This
amount is
p* ¼ ng sg ðng Þ  ð11 rxyÞnasaðnaÞ1 e
ng ð1 ryÞsg ðng Þ : ð13Þ
In principle, even if subordinates do not attempt to take any
direct reproduction (i.e., p* ¼ 0), they may still be evicted by
related dominants because dominants would gain some indi-
rect fitness from independent breeding by subordinates. How-
ever, we find that this threshold never influences predicted
clutch size in our model.
Groups are expected to be stable if taking a share, p, of
direct reproduction yields a higher fitness payoff for subordi-
nates than does independent breeding. The minimum group
size at which this is so is
nmin ¼ 11 h 
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃð11 hÞð11 h  4bnað11 xÞsaðnaÞ1 4beÞ
p
2bð11 hÞ :
ð14Þ
If the cost of eviction, e, is 0, then Equation 14 is the same
threshold for group stability as in the concessions-based
model (see also Johnstone and Cant 1999). If e . 0, groups
may be stable even if h  0.
When eviction is not costly (i.e., e ¼ 0), and males are of
equal genetic quality (y ¼ 1), the clutch size predictions of
the restraint model are identical to those of the concessions
model (Figures 1–3), even though the mechanisms determin-
ing reproductive division and group membership differ. Add-
ing costs of eviction results in decreased nmin so that groups
are more likely to be stable overall and also more likely to be
stable at n*g . The effects of relative subordinate quality on
model predictions are similar to those in the concessions-
based model. Indeed, although the shape of the curve relating
maximum clutch size and quality differs between the models
(Figure 3a,b), these curves intersect the threshold for sub-
ordinate departure at the same value in both models. In other
words, the threshold subordinate quality for group dissolution
is the same in both models. The threshold quality at which
females can produce their optimal clutch size is not the same in
the 2 models. Although the intersection of ng and nmin is not
shown, by extrapolating these lines on Figure 3, it is apparent
that this intersection occurs at a lower value of subordinate
quality in the concessions model. In other words, females can
produce their optimal clutch and still retain the subordinate
at lower values of subordinate quality in a concessions-based
system than in a restraint-based one. Another difference be-
tween the models is that if eviction is costly, e. 0, and subordi-
nates are of higher quality than dominants (y . 1), grouping
can be stable in the restraint model, but not the concessions
model, even if subordinates do not help (or are harmful to
offspring survival, h  0). We would expect a similar effect if
subordinates increase female fitness by improving the genetic
diversity of her offspring or allow females to bet hedge.
As in the previous model, the predicted proportion of di-
rect reproduction obtained by the subordinate (p*) depends
on clutch size (Figure 4). When clutch size is at the female
optimum, p* shows the same patterns as in the classical re-
straint model (Johnstone and Cant 1999), that is, it decreases
with increasing opportunities for independent breeding (at
least when group members are related) and increases with
increasing relatedness (Figure 4b). However, when clutch size
is adjusted to retain subordinates in the group, p* increases
with increasing opportunities for independent breeding, the
opposite pattern to that predicted by previous restraint
models (Johnstone and Cant 1999) and is not influenced by
relatedness (Figure 4b). Furthermore, p* is the same as
predicted in the concessions-based model (Figure 4a,b).
Tug-of-war model
In the tug-of-war model, group membership is not an issue.
Rather, dominant and subordinate males compete in ways that
reduce overall group productivity (e.g., by eating eggs or kill-
ing offspring). Investment in competition by dominants and
subordinates, respectively, is denoted d and u. Subordinates
are assumed to be less efficient at competition (b):
p ¼ bu
d1 bu
: ð15Þ
The fitness functions for dominant and subordinate males
and females, respectively, are
wDðnÞ ¼ ðn  u  dÞsðn; d;uÞ½ð1 pÞ1 rpy; ð16Þ
wSðnÞ ¼ ðn  u  dÞsðn; d;uÞ½py1 r ð1 pÞ; ð17Þ
wf ðnÞ ¼ ðn  u  dÞsðn; d;uÞ½ð1 pÞ1 py1 ff ðnÞ; ð18Þ
where
sðn; d; uÞ ¼ ð1 bðn  u  dÞÞ:
We solve for optimal values of n, u, and d, given the behavior
of the other players in the system as in Reeve et al. (1998) (see
also Johnstone 2000). Joint maximization of this system of
equations generally could not be performed analytically, so
we used numerical approximation in Maple 11.0 (Waterloo
Maple Inc., Waterloo, Ontario, Canada). For a subset ofmodels
that could be solved analytically (i.e., y ¼ 1), the second partial
derivatives of these 3 fitness functions with respect to u, d, or n,
respectively, at the equilibrium were negative; thus, this point
represents a locally stable equilibrium. All model results
were also confirmed with agent-based simulations incorporat-
ing replicator dynamics and occasional mutations to check for
local stability (Hamilton IM, unpublished modeling results).
Clutch size is predicted to decrease with increasing related-
ness between males and as subordinate quality declines (up-
per surface on Figure 5a). This effect is particularly strong
when males are relatives (e.g., r ¼ 0.5 on Figure 5a). Clutch
size is also predicted to increase slightly as subordinate com-
petitive ability increases when r . 0 (not shown). However,
these trends refer only to clutch size produced. The number
of surviving offspring increases with increasing relatedness
between males (the lower surface on Figure 5a), so that a
smaller proportion of offspring is lost (a parameter referred
to as ‘‘aggression’’ in Johnstone 2000) when males are rela-
tives. The proportion of the clutch lost increases as subordi-
nate male quality increases.
For all of the parameter space explored, clutch sizes are
larger and the numbers of surviving offspring are smaller than
expected in the absence of male–male competition (i.e., when
d and u are both 0). As an example, on Figure 5a, the ex-
pected clutch size in the absence of male–male competition
when y ¼ 1 is 50.0 with 37.5 surviving offspring.
The division of reproduction between males does not differ
from that expected under the classical tug-of-war model when
males are of equal genetic quality. The proportion of direct
reproduction obtained by subordinates (p) increases with in-
creasing subordinate efficiency, and there is little influence of
relatedness except when subordinate efficiency is very poor
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(see Reeve et al. 1998). However, if dominant and subordinate
males differ greatly in quality, relatedness may have strong
effects on the subordinate’s share of direct reproduction
(Figure 5b). This share should decrease with increasing re-
latedness if subordinates are of poorer quality than dominants
but increase with increasing relatedness among males if sub-
ordinates are of higher quality than dominants.
DISCUSSION
These models predict that females may benefit from increas-
ing their clutch size when there is a threat of subordinate
male departure or when male–male competition is particularly
costly. In the first of these cases, increases in clutch size are
predicted to be greatest when opportunities for independent
breeding are high (but not sufficiently high that grouping is
unstable) and the effects of helping behavior of subordinate
males on offspring survival are low but not negligible. As the
effects of help increase or opportunities for independent
breeding decrease, subordinates should be more willing to
stay in the group and dominants should be more willing to
accept subordinates. Females are therefore able to produce
clutches closer to or at their own optimum size.
Female control over clutch size strongly influences the di-
vision of reproduction among males. The predictions of clas-
sical skew models are retained only when female clutch size is
invariant. Indeed, in the case of the restraint framework, the
predicted relationship between ecological factors and repro-
ductive skew is the exact opposite of that predicted in the
classical 2-player model. In both the concession and restraint
models, relatedness, a key variable influencing skew in clas-
sical models, has no effect on reproductive division when fe-
male clutch size is superoptimal. Many experimental and
observational tests of transactional skew models have focused
on the predicted relationships between relatedness and skew
(increasing skew with increasing relatedness in concessions
models, decreasing skew with increasing relatedness in re-
straint models; e.g., Field et al. 1998; Ruppell et al. 2002;
Langer et al. 2004; Nonacs et al. 2006; reviewed in Magrath
and Heinsohn 2000; Reeve and Keller 2001). Few tests have
found support for these predictions, suggesting that transac-
tional models are of limited applicability. However, our models
show that the lack of a relationship between relatedness and
skew is not inconsistent with the transactional framework.
The studies cited above focused primarily on skew among
females (e.g., Field et al. 1998; Ruppell et al. 2002; Langer
et al. 2004; Nonacs et al. 2006) and therefore cannot be
directly compared with the predictions of this model; how-
ever, we emphasize that the decisions of other group mem-
bers may lead to very different predictions than would be
obtained from considering only dyadic interactions.
In the second class of models, the tug-of-war framework,
subordinate departure is not a concern. However, competi-
tion between males to monopolize paternity leads to a reduc-
tion in group productivity. In this case, females are predicted
to compensate partially for these losses by producing a larger
clutch. Initial clutch size is always greater, and the number of
offspring surviving is always lower when there are 2 competing
males than when there is only one male in the tug-of-war
model. Furthermore, initial clutch size is expected to be great-
est when relatedness between dominant and subordinate is
low and, if relatedness .0, when subordinate efficiency at
converting investment in competition into competitive suc-
cess is high. These conditions are likely to result in a high
proportion of the clutch being lost to male–male competition.
Surviving clutch size is also lowest for these values, indicating
that compensation is not complete.
We found that relative quality of subordinates influenced
model predictions. Females benefit from the presence of high-
quality subordinates that father offspring and therefore are
more willing to incur costs to retain these males. Clutch size
declined with decreasing quality of subordinates in all models.
This can be seen clearly in the tug-of-war model. However, this
is also the case in the transactional models. On Figure 3, the
clutch size necessary for retention of the subordinate is invari-
ant with respect to subordinate male quality and represents a
minimum clutch size in the group. If subordinates are of suffi-
ciently high quality, females may benefit from producing
a clutch larger than this. Thus, clutches with high-quality sub-
ordinates will be the same size or larger than those with poor-
quality ones. Groups with low-quality subordinates may also
disband.
In the restraint model, females may increase clutch size
to retain subordinates that do not help raise offspring if
subordinates are of sufficiently high genetic quality that the
increase in current offspring quality offsets current and future
Figure 5
Effects of relative quality of subordinate males (y) and relatedness
(r) on (a) predicted clutch size produced (upper surface) and sur-
viving (lower surface) and (b) proportion of offspring of subordi-
nate male in the tug-of-war model. For comparison, the expected
clutch size in the absence of male–male competition in (a) when
y ¼ 1 is 50.0 with 37.5 surviving offspring. Other model parameters:
b ¼ 0.25, b ¼ 0.005, a ¼ 0.005.
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costs of clutch size and helper presence. The ability of females
to increase clutch size results in groups being stable despite
lack of subordinate help over a much broader range of pa-
rameter space than if clutch size were fixed. For example, in
the classical restraint model, an unrelated subordinate that
does not help but does steal reproduction can only steal, at
maximum, e units of reproduction. Grouping would then only
be stable if x , e. In the current model, the amount that it
could steal is a function of the costs of producing young,
opportunities for independent breeding and, to a much lesser
extent, the cost of expulsion, and can range from 0 to 1 (in
principle). Grouping can be stable over a wide range of pa-
rameter space as long as y . 1.
The models presented here are very simple and have the
same drawbacks as other simple skew models. The models
assume simultaneous decisions of all players and perfect
knowledge of clutch size (discussed below), male quality, dis-
persal options, and the thresholds such as p* and nmin. They
also assume that fitness payoffs are density independent. The
incorporation of density-dependent fitness payoffs can have
profound implications for the predictions of skew and similar
models (Kokko and Sutherland 1998; Pen and Weissing 2000;
Hamilton and Taborsky 2005). This is likely to be particularly
relevant to the models presented here; females that produce
large clutches may end up having large numbers of helpers
competing for dominant position (althoughwedonot consider
resource inheritance in the current model). If all females in
a population produce large clutches, this may increase compe-
tition for vacant territories, leading to higher constraints on
dispersal and smaller clutch sizes.
These models assume that all individuals make decisions
simultaneously. This assumption is also implicit in most other
skew models (but see Hamilton 2004). Clearly, the sequence
of decisions may have important implications for the expected
equilibrium of these games. If, for example, dominant males
decide to tolerate subordinates first, then subordinates may
be able to parasitize and females produce a smaller, female-
optimum clutch without the risk of immediate group dissolu-
tion. Incorporating the sequence of moves in the game would
be a valuable addition to these and other skew models.
A critical assumption of the transactional models is that all
group members have information regarding clutch size. We
expect lack of information will strongly influence the model
(as in Kokko 2003; Hamilton and Taborsky 2005). Consider an
extreme case in which males have no information regarding
clutch size except some population-level average. If males tol-
erate one another, but the population average clutch size ex-
ceeds the female’s optimum, a female that produces a smaller
clutch would initially do very well. As these ‘‘small-clutch’’
females spread in the population, males would receive insuf-
ficient direct reproduction to tolerate one another. A female
that did produce a larger clutch again would gain no benefit
because males would not have information that the clutch is
larger. Thus, we would expect the system to degenerate into
pair breeding.
Do males have information regarding clutch size? This
would seem to depend on the mechanisms of fertilization
and the timing of egg laying. With viviparity, long-term sperm
storage or other delays between copulation and offspring pro-
duction, such information will not be available immediately, if
at all. Indeed, with internal fertilization in general, we would
expect females often (but not necessarily) to have more con-
trol over the division of reproduction than is assumed in the
model. Similarly, unless both males are able to inspect the
clutch after it is laid, the required information about clutch
size will not be available to one or both males. Thus, we expect
this model to be most applicable to external fertilizers (par-
ticularly those in which sneak spawning occurs) in which all
males perform direct brood care (and have the opportunity to
measure brood size), as in certain cooperatively breeding fish
(e.g., N. pulcher, Taborsky 1984; Neolamprologus multifasciatus,
Kohler 1998; Neolamprologus savoryi, Heg et al. 2005; Julidochro-
mis ornatus, Awata et al. 2005; Heg and Bachar 2006).
Although few systems may meet all the assumptions of these
models as written, the general predictions are applicable
to a wider range of breeding groups. The restraint model
presented here is also consistent with a model of full female
control over the distribution of paternity but with dominant
males having control over group membership (Hamilton IM,
unpublished modeling results). Again, this version of the
model assumes simultaneous decisions of females and domi-
nant males and that the dominant males have complete in-
formation regarding the division of paternity.
Our models illustrate how strategic decisions by females
over parental investment and mate choice and by males over
group membership and investment in competition interact
to influence reproductive division and group stability. They
make testable predictions regarding the influence of within-
group conflict over group membership or group productivity
on clutch size. Although the variables influencing this conflict
may differ (opportunities for independent breeding in trans-
actional models, cost of expulsion in restraint models, relat-
edness, and subordinate quality in tug-of-war models), all 3
models predict that increased likelihood of group dissolution
or within-group aggression result in larger clutches, at least
initially. There is some existing support for this prediction. In
the cooperatively breeding cichlid, N. pulcher, breeding fe-
males increase their clutch size when helpers have the oppor-
tunity to disperse (i.e., x is high) when helpers are male but
not when helpers are female (Heg et al. 2006). It is not clear
whether the assumptions of these models are met in this sys-
tem, although, in general, tug-of-war or restraint models best
describe the system (Heg et al. 2006).
The models also have important implications for existing
and future tests of the transactional and tug-of-war hypothe-
ses. Over a wide range of parameters, relatedness has no in-
fluence on skew in the transactional models presented here
but may influence skew in tug-of-war models (when male qual-
ities differ). These are opposite of the commonly tested pre-
dictions of the classical models. However, our models do make
several predictions by which the 2 hypotheses may be distin-
guished, if females can adjust clutch sizes. The tug-of-war
model predicts that clutch size decreases with increasing re-
latedness between males; the transactional models predict
no such relationship. The tug-of-war models also predict an
inverse relationship between initial clutch size and final or
surviving clutch size. Thus, initial clutch size increases and
surviving clutch size decreases with decreasing relatedness
and increasing subordinate quality. In the transactional mod-
els, increases in initial clutch size are associated with equal or
greater numbers of surviving offspring whenever breeding
with 2 males is stable (although, by definition, a smaller pro-
portion survives if b . 0).
Finally, our models highlight the influence that other group
members may have on the outcome of dominant–subordinate
interactions in general (see also Reeve 1998; Cant and Reeve
2002; Hamilton and Dill 2002; Frank 2003; Wenseleers et al.
2004). Direct intervention in conflicts by third parties is fre-
quently observed in many social systems (e.g., insects: Ratnieks
1988; Monnin and Ratnieks 2001; fish: Walter and Trillmich
1994; Schradin and Lamprecht 2000; primates: Flack et al.
2005) and may be a critical component of conflict reduction
in animal societies (Frank 1995, 2003). Indirect intervention as
considered here may be similarly important. Our models also
demonstrate the importance of the interaction between mate
choice and intrasexual conflict on the reproductive success of
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group members (as in, e.g., female willingness to increase
clutch size to prevent high-quality subordinates from leaving
or being evicted). Previous considerations of this interaction
have generally focused on female incitement of male–male
competition (Wiley andPoston1996); here, we show apotential
role for female mate-choice decisions in alleviating conflict
as well.
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